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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
I. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING RECEIVER FEES ESTABLISHED
Absent a statutory limitation, the amount of compensation
awarded a court-appointed receiver usually lies within the dis-
cretion of the trial court.1 In Ex parte SiWons 2 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court, while recognizing the discretion of the trial
judge, established a set of criteria providing new guidance to
South Carolina courts in assessing receiver fees. By making the
criteria exclusive, this decision limits the factors available for
consideration by the court appointing the receiver. Three owners
of real and personal property brought an action for partition.
Pursuant to an Order of Settlement, a receiver was appointed
3
and empowered to secure appraisals, list the property for sale,
and employ accountants to examine the books and records of
the partnership. The receiver also was allowed to employ any
others needed to dissolve the partnership and sell the property.4
The three owners reached a second settlement, and the receiver-
ship was terminated.
The receiver, an attorney, had performed ninety-three hours
of work during the two-month period of receivership. The trial
court awarded $25,000 in compensation for his services and re-
imbursed his costs. The supreme court affirmed the award for
costs, reversed the compensation award, and remanded the case
1. Annotation, Measure and Amount of Compensation of Receiver Appointed by
Federal Court, 6 A.L.R. FED. 817 (1971). In 1950, S.C. Con ANN. § 584 (1942), providing
for a five percent commission of the amounts received and disbursed by a receiver, was
eliminated by an Act which allowed the amount of compensation to be determined by
the court appointing the receiver. Note, Recent Legislation-A Summary of the General
Enactments of the 1950 General Assembly, 3 S.C.L.Q. 51, 55 (1950) (citing 1950 S.C.
Acts 721). S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-65-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides: "Receivers of the
property within this State of foreign or other corporations shall be allowed such commis-
sions as may be fixed by the court appointing them."
2. 289 S.C. 1, 344 S.E.2d 151 (1986).
3. The respondent replaced the original receiver, who resigned aid received $1,000
as compensation plus $30 reimbursement for eighteen hours and forty-five minutes of
work. The petitioners did not contest the compensation of the original receiver. Record
at 17-19.
4. Id. at 7.
1
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for determination of fees." The court adopted the following eight
factors to be considered in determining fees: (1) The nature, ex-
tent, and value of the administered property; (2) the complexity
and difficulty of the work; (3) the time spent; (4) the knowledge,
experience, labor, and skill required of, or devoted by the re-
ceiver; (5) the diligence and thoroughness displayed; (6) the re-
sults accomplished; (7) the amount of money coming into the
receiver's hands; and (8) the fair market value, measured by
conservative business standards, of the services rendered.6
The appointment of a receiver by a court is a strong remedy
which should be cautiously undertaken.7 Although appointment
is authorized by statute," no formula previously existed for de-
termining fees in South Carolina. 9 Several cases have involved
disputes over the amount of compensation awarded, but no case
law has provided a method for assessing the fee. In each case the
court merely affirmed the award as within the discretion of the
trial court.10 The general tenets that compensation should never
5. 289 S.C. at 3, 344 S.E.2d at 152.
6. Id.
7. "The effect of the appointment of a receiver is to take property, at the instance
of the moving party, out of the possession of the person in whose possession it is found
and place it in the hands of a third party pending litigation." Truesdell v. Johnson, 144
S.C. 188, 197, 142 S.E. 343, 345 (1928). All three corporations approved the appointment
of a receiver by settlement. Record at 5-6.
8. Section 15-65-10 of the South Carolina Code provides as follows:
A receiver may be appointed by a judge of the circuit court, either in or
out of court:
(1) Before judgment, on the application of either party, when he estab-
lishes an apparent right to property which is the subject of the action and
which is in the possession of an adverse party and the property, or its rents
and profits, are in danger of being lost or materially injured or impaired, ex-
cept in cases when judgment upon failure to answer may be had without appli-
cation to the court;
(2) After judgment, to carry the judgment into effect;
(3) After judgment, to dispose of the property according to the judgment
or to preserve it during the pendency of an appeal or when an execution has
been returned unsatisfied and the judgment debtor refuses to apply his prop-
erty in satisfaction of the judgment;
(4) When a corporation has been dissolved, is insolvent or in imminent
danger of insolvency or has forfeited its corporate rights, and, in like cases, of
the property within this State of foreign corporations; and
(5) In such other cases as are provided by law or may be in accordance
with the existing practice, except as otherwise provided in this Code.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-65-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
9. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10. "The commissions to be allowed a receiver are not definitely fixed by statute
2
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be more than that which is fair and reasonable,11 and that it
should never be vicariously generous,12 were too general to be of
much practical use.
In Simons the court looked to other jurisdictions in formu-
lating the South Carolina rule. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
in Bergeron v. Sessions s set forth the first six criteria adopted
in Simons, calling them "the controlling factors in ascertaining
this value [of receiver compensation]."' 4 The Simons court
added two other factors: the amount of money coming into the
receiver's hands 5 and the fair value of the services rendered
measured by conservative business standards. 6 The court noted
that the first of these two additional elements, although appar-
ently duplicative of "the results accomplished," should be dis-
tinguished because "[i]t is conceivable that a receiver may
achieve beneficial results other than simply assembling funds.'
7
The distinction indicates that a trial judge may consider
achievements which are more difficult to quantify. The second of
the two additional elements makes clear the propriety of consid-
ering evidence of the value of comparable work in the private
business sector.'
...but that seems to be a matter left to the discretion of the Court." Mann v. Poole, 48
S.C. 154, 163, 26 S.E. 229, 233 (1897); "There is but one question in this case, and that is
as to the amount of these [receiver] allowances. The amount is within the discretion of
the Circuit Judge, and it does not appear that Judge Sease abused his discretion." Car-
roll v. Cash Mills, 123 S.C. 506, 507, 117 S.E. 184, 184 (1923); "As to the receiver's com-
pensation: the general rule is that it is within the discretion of the court. No abuse of
that discretion appears." Turner v. Washington Realty Co., 125 S.C. 109, 114-15, 118
S.E. 30, 31 (1923) (citations omitted). In Simons the trial judge apparently recognized
the problem when he stated, "I wish I had a formula that I could go by." Record at 66.
11. Guaranty Trust v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 68 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Va. 1946).
12. Coskery v. Roberts & Mander Corp., 200 F.2d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 1952).
13. 561 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
14. Id. at 554.
15. See Feemster v. Schurkman, 291 So. 2d 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
16. See 200 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1952).
17. 289 S.C. at 3 n.2, 344 S.E.2d at 152 n.2.
18. The displeasure of the Petitioners with the trial court's award was succinctly
summarized in their brief to the court:
The Appellants offered testimony that a South Carolina bank would have per-
formed the same services as the receiver here for a maximum fee of $10,625.00,
which included a $50.00 per hour charge for problematic work which would not
always be charged, and a termination fee. The award made by the lower court
was more than twice this amount. Moreover, the Receiver, in his ordinary prac-
tice, charges an hourly rate of $65-75 per hour. Again, the compensation
awarded this receiver was more than three times his hourly rate.
3
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Although the court did not indicate the relative weight to be
accorded the new criteria, the selection of the eight factors is
important because the criteria are apparently exclusive. The su-
preme court expressly rejected the conclusion of the trial judge
who based the award upon " 'duly and carefully considering the
proceedings and detailed testimony herein and, further, upon
my knowledge of the complexities and difficult circumstances
confronted by the Receiver.' "19 Because the eight factors are
exclusive, the "anxiety that may have been caused the receiver
and the difficulties he[] encountered" 20 are not compensable
under the new rule. In an unsuccessful argument, the respon-
dent contended "that stress, strain, and anxiety are natural con-
comitants to the undertaking of any task which is complex, diffi-
cult and laden with sobering responsibilities. The emotional
responses can and should be considered in evaluating the degree
of difficulty and/or complexity of any human endeavor."'2' The
difficulty of the work then is determined by individual tasks ac-
complished, not by particular, even significant difficulties caused
a receiver because of the uncooperative nature of the parties
involved.2
Generally, the burden is on the receiver to establish the ser-
vices provided and benefits obtained which entitle him to com-
pensation.23 In Simons testimony indicated that the receiver's
task involved a diversity of business activities.2 4 Despite this tes-
Brief of the Appellant at 22-23. The lower court dismissed the bank's testimony as irrele-
vant at the close of the hearing. Record at 60-62.
19. 289 S.C. at 2, 344 S.E.2d at 152 (quoting the Order for Judgment dated January
29, 1985).
20. Record at 68.
21. Brief of Respondent at 5.
22. The receiver described the difficulties of his duties as follows:
The following areas of responsibility were the Respondent's basic charge,
each of which required time, care and attention:
(1) Analysis of accountant's reports, equalization of capital ac-
counts, and making demands on the parties for funds to pay ongoing
expenses;
(2) Preparation for sale, and sale of, furniture; and
(3) Renovation and repair of, and subsequent sale of, Joye Cottage.
The total failure of one or more of the Appellants to cooperate in no. 1, supra,
created havoc with the Receivership and rendered it more time-consuming and
frustrating than it otherwise might have been.
Brief of Respondent at 7 (citation omitted).
23. See, e.g., Lewis v. Granil Corp., 94 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1957).
24. See Record at 25-33.
[Vol. 39
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss1/12
1987] SECURED TRANSACTIONS
timony, the court implicitly cautioned receivers to account care-
fully for their time and expense.
Although Simons may discourage receiverships in particu-
larly difficult or problematic circumstances, the opinion clarifies
the standards for determining fees. The criteria, employed by
courts in a more formal and exclusive manner than in the past,
will be as useful to receivers as they will be to judges.
James D. Myrick
II. NOTICE, COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS UNDER U.C.C.
SECTION 36-9-504(3) INTERPRETED
Section 36-9-504(3) of the South Carolina Code25 was the
subject of two recent cases of first impression involving defi-
ciency judgment actions. The South Carolina Supreme Court in-
terpreted the "notice" requirement of section 36-9-504(3) in Alt-
man Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Weaver.28 In Mid-Continent
Refrigerator Co. v. Carpenter the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals decided who should bear the burden of proving whether a
sale was conducted in a "commercially reasonable" manner as
required by the statute.
In Altman the supreme court held that the notice provision
of section 36-9-504(3) does not require that the debtor actually
receive the notice if the secured party takes reasonable steps to
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-504(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides as follows:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and
may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but
every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner time, place and
terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or
threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public
sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has
a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing state-
ment indexed in the name of the debtor in this State or who is known by the
secured party to have a security interest in the collateral. The secured party
may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in
a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed
standard price quotations he may buy at private sale.
26. 288 S.C. 449, 343 S.E.2d 444 (1986).
27. 287 S.C. 624, 340 S.E.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1986).
5
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see that the debtor is notified. 8 In applying this rule to the Alt-
man facts, the court noted that the secured party complied with
section 36-9-504(3) by sending the notice by registered mail
properly addressed to the debtor.2 The court further held that
the secured party was not required to take any additional action,
even though a third party had signed the return receipt.
3 0
The Mid-Continent court held that in accordance with sec-
tion 36-9-504(3), a secured creditor has the burden of proving
that the resale of secured collateral was conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. 31 The court ruled that because the se-
cured party did not present evidence of the value of the collat-
eral at the time of the resale or other evidence which would
enable the jury to determine whether the sale was commercially
reasonable, the secured party was not entitled to a deficiency
judgment.3 2 Altman and Mid-Continent follow the general rule
on their respective issues.33
In Mid-Continent the Carpenters purchased grocery store
equipment from Mid-Continent. Mid-Continent repossessed the
equipment after the Carpenters defaulted on their payments.
When Mid-Continent could not resell the equipment, it pur-
chased the equipment and brought a deficiency judgment action
against the Carpenters.3 4 At trial the parties stipulated that the
sole issue in deciding if Mid-Continent was entitled to a defi-
ciency judgment was whether Mid-Continent sold the equip-
ment in a commercially reasonable manner. On appeal the South
Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned that when the secured party
has not introduced evidence supporting the commercial reasona-
bleness of the resale of repossessed collateral, the secured party
has not met the burden of proof on the issue and is not entitled
to a deficiency judgment. Citing Associates Commercial Corp. v.
28. 288 S.C. at 451, 343 S.E.2d at 445.
29, Id.
30, Id.
31. 287 S.C. at 625, 340 S.E.2d at 560.
32. Id.
33, See generally Annotation, Sufficiency of Secured Party's Notification of Sale or
Other Intended Disposition of Collateral Under UCC § 9-504(3), 11 A.L.R.4TH 241
(1982); Annotation, Uniform Commercial Code: Burden of Proof As To Commercially
Reasonable Disposition of Collateral, 59 A.L.R.3D 369 (1974).
34. 287 S.C. at 625, 340 S.E.2d at 560. Mid-Continent sought a deficiency judgment
from the Carpenters for the difference between the balance owed on the account and the
price realized upon purchase.
[Vol. 39
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss1/12
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Hammond,35 the court noted that although the determination of
whether a sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable man-
ner is usually a jury question, "it is a matter for the court when
the evidence is capable of only one reasonable inference.""
The court was unwilling to weigh evidence presented by
Mid-Continent of how the resale was conducted without intro-
duction of evidence of the value of the collateral or other evi-
dence indicating commercial reasonableness.' Apparently, the
court examined the elements of method, manner, time, place,
and terms collectively; some evidence of the commercial reason-
ableness of each of these aspects is necessary for a secured credi-
tor to meet its burden of proof.
38
In adopting the rule that the secured party bears the bur-
den of proving that a sale of secured collateral was conducted in
a commercially reasonable manner, the court relied on Hender-
son Few & Co. v. Rollins Communications, Inc.39 This rule is
common to other jurisdictions.4 °
The facts in Altman Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Weaver
are similar to those in Mid-Continent. In Altman Weaver pur-
chased from Altman farm equipment which Altman repossessed
after Weaver defaulted on his payments. After repossession Alt-
man sold the equipment and brought a deficiency judgment ac-
tion against Weaver. Before the sale Altman sent a properly ad-
dressed notice to Weaver by registered mail and received a
return receipt, signed by a third party whom Weaver claimed he
did not know. In a nonjury trial the court granted a deficiency
judgment in favor of Altman. On appeal Weaver argued that the
trial judge erred in finding that Altman had sent reasonable no-
tification of the sale as required by section 36-9-504(3) and,
therefore, erred in allowing the deficiency judgment.
35. 285 S.C. 277, 220 S.E.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1985).
36. 287 S.C. at 625, 340 S.E.2d at 560 (citations omitted).
37. Id.
38. Annotation, What is "Commercially Reasonable" Disposition of Collateral Re-
quired by UCC § 9-504(3), 7 A.L.R.4TH 308 (1981).
39. 148 Ga. App. 139, 250 S.E.2d 830 (1978).
40. See, e.g., Giddens v. Bo Lovein Ford, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 699, 307 S.E.2d 271
(1983); Tauber v. Johnson, 8 IM. App. 3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180 (1972); Chemlease World-
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Applying the U.C.C. definitions of "notifies"41 and "send,"4
the Altman court reasoned that the notice provision of section
36-9-504(3) does not require that the debtor actually receive the
notice, but, instead, that the secured party take reasonable steps
to see that the debtor is notified. The court reasoned that the
secured party had complied fully with section 36-9-504(3) by
sending a properly addressed notice to the debtor by registered
mail; the secured party did not have to take further action sim-
ply because a third party, rather than Weaver, signed the return
receipt. The court's reasoning in Altman is consistent with the
U.C.C. definitions of "send" and "notifies." The decision marks
South Carolina's adoption of the general rule in this area.4" In
supporting its decision that actual receipt of the notice of sale is
not required, the court relied on Day v. Schenectady Discount
Corp.," Hall v. Owen County State Bank,45 James Talcott, Inc.
v. Reynolds, 4  and First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Her-
mann.47 Decisions from other jurisdictions also support this
rule.45
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(26) (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides as follows: "A person
'notifies' or 'gives' a notice or notification to another by taking such steps as may be
reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course whether or not such other
actually comes to know it."
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(38) (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides as follows:
'Send' in connection with any writing or notice means to deposit in the
mail Or deliver for transmission by any other usual means of communication
with postage or cost of transmission provided for and properly addressed and
in the case of an instrument to an address specified thereon or otherwise
agreed, or if there be none to any address reasonable under the circumstances.
43. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 26-10, at 1112 (2d ed. 1980). See generally Annotation, Sufficiency of
Secured Party's Notification of Sale or Other Intended Disposition of Collateral Under
UCC § 9-504(3), 11 A.L.R.4TH 241 (1982).
44. 125 Ariz. 564, 611 P.2d 568 (Ct. App. 1980) (under a statutory definition of no-
tice for a proposed sale of repossessed collateral, the test is not whether the debtor re-
ceived notice, but only whether the secured party made a good faith effort to give
notice).
45. 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977) (the test is not whether the debtor
receives the notice, but whether the secured party made a good faith effort and took such
steps as a reasonable person would have taken to give notice).
46. 165 Mont. 404, 529 P.2d 352 (1974) (U.C.C. requires only that creditor take rea-
sonable steps to insure that debtor is notified).
47. 205 Neb. 169, 286 N.W.2d 750 (1974) (notification under U.C.C. for disposition
of collateral does not depend upon whether the notification actually reached the person
to whom it was sent).
48. See Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62
(1970); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983); Cessna
8
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In support of its holding that a return receipt signed by a
third party does not create a need for further action on the part
of a secured party, the Altman court relied on Central Trust Co.
v. Cohen49 and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thomas.50
The rule insures that an undue burden will not be placed on a
secured party who takes reasonable steps to see that the debtor
is notified.
Mid-Continent and Altman place South Carolina in the
mainstream of jurisdictions on their respective issues. The prac-
titioner representing a secured creditor in a deficiency judgment
action should note that he must present evidence of the com-
mercial reasonableness of the method, manner, time, place, and
terms of the sale in order to sustain his burden of proof.
Matthew S. Moore III
Fin. Corp. v. Meyers, 575 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1978).
49. 14 Ohio Misc. 2d 8, 470 N.E.2d 498 (1984) (service by certified mail to the ad-
dress listed by defendants as residence was reasonable notification despite receipt of let-
ter by third party not known to defendants).
50. 15 Ohio Misc. 2d 267, 237 N.E.2d 427 (1968) (holder of a retail installment con-
tract was entitled to deficiency judgment when notice of sale was sent by certified mail
and delivered at trailer court which was given as buyer's address and where buyer still
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